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a b s t r a c t
According to actual needs, a generalized signcryption scheme can flexibly work as an en-
cryption scheme, a signature scheme or a signcryption scheme. In this paper, firstly, we
give a security model for identity based generalized signcryption which is more com-
plete than the existing model. Secondly, we propose an identity based generalized sign-
cryption scheme. Thirdly, we give the security proof of the new scheme in this complete
model. Compared with existing identity based generalized signcryption, the new scheme
has less implementation complexity. Moreover, the new scheme has comparable compu-
tation complexity with the existing normal signcryption schemes.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Encryption and signature are fundamental tools of Public Key Cryptography for confidentiality and authenticity respec-
tively. Traditionally, these two main building-blocks have been considered as independent entities. However, these two
basic cryptographic techniques may be combined together in various ways, such as sign-then-encrypt and encrypt-then-
sign, in many applications to ensure privacy and authenticity simultaneously. To enhance efficiency, Zheng [17] proposed
a novel conception named signcryption, which can fulfill both the functions of signature and encryption in a logical step.
Comparedwith traditionalmethods, signcryption has less computation complexity, less communication complexity and less
implementation complexity. As a result of the signcryption scheme having so many advantages and extensive application
prospects, many public key based signcryption schemes have been proposed [18,2,10,8].
Identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [15] in 1984, in which the public keys of users are respectively
their identities and the secret keys of users are created by a credit third party named Public Key Generator (PKG). In this
way, the identity-based cryptography greatly relieves the burden of public keymanagement and provides amore convenient
alternative to the conventional public key infrastructure. In [15], Shamir proposed an identity based signature scheme but
for many years there was not an identity based encryption scheme. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [1] using bilinear pairing
gave a practical secure identity based encryption scheme. The first identity based signcryption scheme was proposed by
Malone-Lee [13] along with a security model. Since then, many identity based signcryption schemes have been proposed
[12,3,7,5].
Signcryption has considered these application environments that need simultaneousmessage privacy and data integrity.
However, in some applications, these two properties are not essential. That is, sometimes only message confidentiality is
needed or sometimes only authenticity is needed. In this case, in order to ensure privacy or authenticity separately, signcryp-
tionmust preserve the signmodule or encryptionmodule, whichmust increase the corresponding computation complexity
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +86 13783717183.
E-mail address: ygygang@126.com (G. Yu).
0304-3975/$ – see front matter© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2010.06.003
G. Yu et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 3614–3624 3615
and implementation complexity. To decrease implementation complexity, Han et al. [9] proposed a new primitive called
generalized signcryption, which can work as an encryption scheme, a signature scheme or a signcryption scheme, and gave
a generalized signcryption based on ECDSA. Wang et al. [16] gave the formal security notions for this new primitive and
improved the original generalized signcryption proposed by Han et al. [9]. In [16], Wang et al. pointed out some open prob-
lems. One of these problems is to enhance efficiency. Another of these problems is to design identity based generalized
signcryption scheme.
Lal et al. [11] gave an identity based generalized signcryption scheme (IDGSC). However, after much study, we find his
security model is not complete. And his scheme is not secure under the complete security model for IDGSC. In this paper,
our main works include three aspects. Firstly, in the second section, we give the definition of IDGSC and the security model
for IDGSC. Secondly, in Section 3, we propose an efficient IDGSC. Thirdly, in Section 4, we give the efficiency analysis and
security results.
2. IDGSC and its security notions
2.1. Definition of IDGSC
Firstly, we will review the algorithm constitution of identity based encryption (IDEC), identity based signature (IDSG)
and identity based signcryption (IDSC). Then, we will introduce the algorithms that consist of an identity based generalized
signcryption (IDGSC).
Definition 1. A normal identity based encryption scheme
IDEC = (Setup, Extract, Encrypt,Decrypt)
consists of four algorithms.
Setup: This is the system initialization algorithm. On input of the security parameter 1k, this algorithm generates the system
parameters params and the PKG generates his master key s and public key PPub. The global public parameters include params
and PPub. We write ((params, PPub), s)← Setup(1k).
Extract: This is the user key generation algorithm. Given some user’s identity ID, PKG uses it to produce a pair of corre-
sponding public/private keys. We write (SID,QID)← Extract(ID, s).
Encrypt: It takes as input a receiver’s identity IDr and a message m, using the public parameters (params, PPub), outputs a
ciphertext ε. We write ε← Encrypt(IDr ,m).
Decrypt: It takes as input a receiver’s private key Sr and a ciphertext ε, using the public parameters (params, PPub), outputs
a messagem or the invalid symbol⊥. We writem← Decrypt(Sr , ε).
Definition 2. A normal identity based signature scheme
IDSG = (Setup, Extract, Sign, Verify)
consists of four algorithms.
Setup: It is the same as the corresponding Setup algorithm in Definition 1.
Extract: It is the same as the Extract algorithm in Definition 1.
Sign: This algorithm takes as input a signer’s private key Ss and a message m, using the public parameters (params, PPub),
outputs a signature σ . We write σ ← Sign(Ss,m).
Verify: This algorithm takes as input the signer’s public key Qs, a messagem and the corresponding signature σ , and outputs
the valid symbol> or the invalid symbol⊥. We write (> or ⊥)← Verify(Qs,m, σ ).
Definition 3. A normal identity based signcryption scheme
IDSC = (Setup, Extract, Signcrypt,Unsigncrypt)
consists of four algorithms.
Setup: It is the same as the corresponding Setup algorithm in Definition 1.
Extract: It is the same as the Extract algorithm in Definition 1.
Signcrypt: This algorithm takes as input the sender’s private key Ss, the receiver’s public key Qr and a messagem, using the
public parameters (params, PPub), outputs a ciphertext δ. We write δ← SC(Ss,Qr ,m).
Unsigncrypt: This algorithm takes as input the sender’s public key Qs, the receiver’s secret key Sr and a ciphertext δ, using
the public parameters (params, PPub), outputs a messagem or the invalid symbol⊥. We writem← UC(Qs, Sr , δ).
The generalized signcryption scheme can work as encryption scheme, signature scheme and signcryption scheme
according to different needs. Let IDSG = (Setup, Extract, Sign, Verify), IDEC = (Setup, Extract, Encryp t,Decrypt) and IDSC =
(Setup, Extract, Signcrypt,Unsigncrypt) respectively be an identity based signature scheme, encryption scheme and
signcryption scheme.
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Definition 4. An identity based generalized signcryption scheme IDGSC = (Setup, Extract,GSC,GUC)consists of following
four algorithms:
Setup: It is the same as the corresponding Setup algorithm in Definition 1.
Extract: It is the same as the Extract algorithm in Definition 1.
GSC: for a messagem,
-When IDs ∈ Φ(IDs = 0), ε← GSC(Φ,Qr ,m) = Encrypt(Qr ,m).
-When IDr ∈ Φ(IDr = 0), σ ← GSC(Ss,Φ,m) = Sign(Ss,m).
-When IDs /∈ Φ, IDr /∈ Φ , δ← GSC(Ss,Qr ,m) = SC(Ss,Qr ,m).
GUC: to unsigncrypt a ciphertext δ,
-When IDs ∈ Φ(IDs = 0),m← GUC(Φ,Qr , ε) = Decrypt(Qr , ε).
-When IDr ∈ Φ(IDr = 0), (>,⊥)← GUC(Ss,Φ, σ ) = Verify(Ss, σ ).
-When IDs /∈ Φ, IDr /∈ Φ ,m← GUC(Qs, Sr , δ) = UC(Qs, Sr , δ).
2.2. Security models for IDGSC
In our security model, there are seven types of query that the adversary Amay issue to the challenger C for answers. In
the following text, ‘‘Alice{Text1} → Bob, and then Bob{Text2} → Alice’’ denotes that Alice submits Text1 to Bob, and then
Bob responds with Text2 to Alice.
Extract query: A{ID} → C , and then C{SID = Extract(ID)} → A
Sign query: A{IDs,m} → C , and then C{σ = Sign(Ss,m)} → A
Verify query: A{IDs, σ } → C , and then C{(> or ⊥) = Verify(Qs, σ )} → A
Encrypt query: A{IDr ,m} → C , and then C{ε = Encrypt(Qr ,m)} → A
Decrypt query: A{IDr , ε} → C , and then C{m = Decrypt(Sr , ε)} → A
GSC query: A{IDs, IDr ,m} → C , and then C{δ = GSC(Ss,Qr ,m)} → A
GUC query: A{IDs, IDr , δ} → C , and then C{m = GUC(Qs, Sr , δ)} → A
The generalized signcryption canwork in threemodes: in signaturemode, in encryptionmode and in signcryptionmode,
denoted IDGSC-IN-SG, IDGSC-IN-EN and IDGSC-IN-SC respectively. Firstly, we define the confidentiality of IDGSC-IN-EN
(Definition 5) and IDGSC-IN-SC (Definition 6) separately.
Definition 5. IND-(IDGSC-IN-EN)-CCA Security
Consider the following game played by a challenger C and an adversary A.
Game 1
Initialize. Challenger C runs Setup(1k) and sends the public parameters (params, PPub) to the adversary A. C keepsmaster key
s secret.
Phase 1. In Phase 1, A performs a polynomially bounded number of above seven types of queries. These queries made by A
are adaptive; that is every query may depend on the answers to previous queries.
Challenge. The adversary A chooses two identities IDA = 0, IDB 6= 0 and two messagesm0,m1. Here, the adversary A cannot
have asked Extract query on IDB in Phase 1. The challenger C flips a fair binary coin γ , encryptsmγ and then sends the target
ciphertext ε∗ to A.
Phase 2. In this phase, A again asks a polynomially bounded number of the above queries with a natural restriction that he
cannot make Extract queries on IDB, and he cannot ask Decrypt query on target ciphertext ε∗.
Guess. Finally, A produces his guess γ
′
on γ , and wins the game if γ
′ = γ .
A’s advantage of winning Game 1 is defined to be Advind−cca2Aidgsc−in−en(t, p) = |2P[γ
′ = γ ] − 1|. We say that identity based
generalized signcryption in encryptionmode is IND-(IDGSC-IN-EN)-CCA secure if no polynomially bounded adversary A has
a non-negligible advantage in Game 1.
Definition 6. IND-(IDGSC-IN-SC)-CCA Security
Consider the following game played by a challenger C and an adversary A.
Game 2
Initialize. and Phase 1.
Challenger C and adversary A act the same as they do in the corresponding stage in Game 1.
Challenge. The adversary A chooses two identities IDA 6= 0, IDB 6= 0 and two messagesm0,m1. Here, the adversary A cannot
have asked Extract query on IDB in Phase 1. The challenger C flips a fair binary coin γ , signcrypts mγ and then sends the
target ciphertext δ∗ to A.
Phase 2. In this phase, A asks a polynomially bounded number of above queries just with a natural restriction that he cannot
make Extract queries on IDB, and he cannot ask Unsigncrypt query on target ciphertext δ∗.
Guess. Finally, A produces his guess γ
′
on γ , and wins the game if γ
′ = γ .
A’s advantage of winning Game 1 is defined to beAdvind−cca2Aidgsc−in−sc (t, p) = |2P[γ
′ = γ ] − 1|. We say that identity based
generalized signcryption in signcryption mode is IND-(IDGSC-IN-SC)-CCA secure if no polynomially bounded adversary A
has a non-negligible advantage in Game 2.
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Note 1. The differences between Definitions 5 and 6 deserve to be mentioned. Firstly, in Phase 2 of Definition 5, the
adversary is prohibited from making Decrypt query on the challenge ciphertext. However, he can transform the challenge
ciphertext into some valid signcryption ciphertext and make Unsigncrypt query on the corresponding signcryption cipher-
text. Secondly, the adversary is restricted not to make Unsigncrypt query on the challenge ciphertext in Phase 2 of Defini-
tion 6. But, he can transform the challenge ciphertext into some valid encryption ciphertext andmake Decrypt query on the
corresponding encryption ciphertext. Such differences are not considered in the security model proposed by Lal et al. [11].
Secondly, we define the unforgeability of IDGSC-IN-SG (Definition 7) and IDGSC-IN-SC (Definition 8) separately.
Definition 7. EF-(IDGSC-IN-SG)-ACMA Security
Consider the following game played by a challenger C and an adversary A.
Game 3
Initialize. Challenger C runs Setup(1k) and sends the public parameters (params, PPub) to the adversary A. C keeps the master
key s secret.
Probe. In this phase, A performs a polynomially bounded number of above seven kinds of queries.
Forge. Finally, A produces two identities IDA, IDB, where IDB = 0, and a ciphertext σ ∗ = (X∗,m∗, V ∗). The adversary wins
the game if: IDA 6= 0; Verify(m∗, IDA, (X∗, V ∗)) = >; no Extraction query was made on IDA; (X∗, V ∗) was not result from
Sign(m∗) query with signer IDA.
We define the advantage of A to be advef−acmaAidgsc−in−sg (t, p) = Pr[Awins]. We say that an identity based generalized sign-
cryption in signature mode is EF-(IDGSC-IN-SG)-ACMA secure if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible
advantage in Game 3.
Definition 8. EF-(IDGSC-IN-SC)-ACMA Security
Consider the following game played by a challenger C and an adversary A.
Game 4
Initialize. Challenger C runs Setup(1k) and sends the public parameters (params, PPub) to the adversary A. C keeps the master
key s secret.
Probe. In this phase, A performs a polynomially bounded number of above seven kinds of queries.
Forge. Finally, A produces two identities IDA, IDB, and a ciphertext σ ∗ = (X∗, C∗, V ∗). Letm∗ be the result of unsigncrypting
δ∗ under the secret key corresponding to IDB.The adversarywins the game if: IDA 6= 0; IDA 6= IDB;Verify(m∗, IDA, (X∗, V ∗)) =
>; no Extraction query was made on IDA; (δ∗, IDA, IDB)was not output by a Signcrypt query.
We define the advantage of A to be Advef−acmaAidgsc−insc (t, p) = Pr[Awins]. We say that an identity based signcryption in
signcryptionmode is EF-(IDGSC-IN-SC)-ACMA secure if no polynomially bounded adversary has a non-negligible advantage
in Game 4.
Note 2. The differences between Definitions 7 and 8 also need to be noticed. In Definition 7, the forged signature is not
obtained from the Signquery. But it can be transformed fromsomevalid signcryption ciphertext that is gotten fromSigncrypt
query. In contrast, in Definition 8, the forged signcryption ciphertext is not the output of Signcrypt query. But it can be
transformed from some answer of the Sign query. Such differences are not considered in the security model proposed by Lal
et al. [11]. Consequently, in Lal et al. [11]’s scheme, the adversary can easily forge a valid signature through a corresponding
Signcrypt query and Unsigncrypt query.
3. Our scheme
3.1. Description of our scheme
Before describing our scheme we need to define a special function f (ID), where ID ∈ {0, 1}n1 . If identity is vacant, that is
ID ∈ Φ , let ID = 0, f (ID) = 0; in other cases, f (ID) = 1. The concrete algorithms of our scheme are described as follows.
Setup: Given the security parameter 1k, this algorithm outputs: two cycle groups (G1,+) and (G2, ·) of prime order q, a
generator P of G1, a bilinear map eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 between G1 and G2, four hash functions:
H0 : {0, 1}n1 → G∗1; H1 : G2 → {0, 1}n2 × {0, 1}n1 × G∗1;
H2 : {0, 1}n2 × {0, 1}n1 × {0, 1}n1 → Z∗q ; H3 : {0, 1}n2 × G1 → Z∗q
where n1 and n2 respectively denote the bit length of user’s identity and the message. Here H0,H1 needs to satisfy an
additional property: H0(0) = ϑ,H1(1) = 0, where ϑ denotes the infinite element in group G1.The system parameters are
params = {G1,G2, q, n1, n2, eˆ, P,H0,H1, H2,H3}. Then, PKG chooses s randomly from Z∗q as his master key, and computes
PPub = sP as his public key. The global public parameters are (params, PPub) = {G1,G2, q, n1, n2, eˆ, P, PPub,H0,H1,H2,H3}.
Extract: each user in the system with identity IDU ; his public key QU = H0(IDU) is a simple transform from his identity.
Then PKG computes private key SU = sQU for IDU .
Generalized Signcryption: Suppose Alice with identity IDA wants to send message m to Bob whose identity is IDB, he does
as following:
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- Computes f (IDA) and f (IDB).
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||IDA||IDB) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2P + f (IDA) · h3 · SA).
- Computes QB = H0(IDB) andw = eˆ(PPub,QB)r·f (IDB).
- Computes h1 = H1(w) and y = m||IDA||V ⊕ h1.
- Sends (X, y) to Bob.
Generalized Unsigncryption: After receiving (X, y):
- Computes f (IDB).
- Computesw = eˆ(X, SB)f (IDB), h1 = H1(w),m||IDA||V = y⊕ h1.
- Computes h2 = H2(m||IDA||IDB) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P)h2 · eˆ(PPub,QA)h3·f (IDA), if not, returns⊥. Else, returnsm.
3.2. Correctness
There are three cases to be considered.
Case 1. IDGSC-IN-SC
In this case, there is IDA, IDB /∈ Φ (That is IDA, IDB 6= 0), so f (IDA) = f (IDB) = 1 and the scheme is actually a signcryption
scheme. It is easy to verify that:
w = eˆ(PPub,QB)r = eˆ(X, SB);
eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(rP, r−1(h2P + h3 · SA) = eˆ(P, P)h2 · eˆ(PPub,QA)h3 ;
UC(IDA, IDB, SC(IDA, IDB,m)) = m.
So our scheme in signcryption mode is correct.
Case 2. IDGSC-IN-SG
In this case, there is IDA /∈ Φ, IDB ∈ Φ (That is IDA 6= 0, IDB = 0.), so f (IDA) = 1, f (IDB) = 0. The generalized signcryption
scheme in signature mode is as follows:
Sign:
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||IDA||0) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2P + f (IDA) · h3 · SA) = r−1(h2P + h3 · SA).
- Computes QB = H0(0) = ϑ andw = eˆ(PPub, ϑ)r·f (IDB) = 1.
- Computes h1 = H1(w) = H1(1) = 0 and y = m||IDA||V ⊕ 0 = m||IDA||V .
- Outputs the signature(X,m||IDA||V ).
Verify:
- Computes h2 = H2(m||IDA||0) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P)h2 · eˆ(PPub,QA)h3 , if not, returns⊥.
In fact, the reduced signature scheme is the signature scheme, denoted PSG, proposed by Paterson [14].
Case 3. IDGSC-IN-EN
In this case, there is IDA ∈ Φ, IDB /∈ Φ (That is IDA = 0, IDB 6= 0.), so f (IDA) = 0, f (IDB) = 1. The generalized signcryption
scheme in encryption mode is as follows:
Encrypt:
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||0||IDB) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2P + f (IDA) · h3 · SA) = r−1h2P .
- Computes QB = H0(IDB) andw = eˆ(PPub,QB)r .
- Computes h1 = H1(w) and y = m||0||V ⊕ h1.
- Sends (X, y) to Bob.
Decrypt:
- Computes f (IDB).
- Computesw = eˆ(X, SB)f (IDB) = eˆ(X, SB) and h1 = H1(w).
- Computesm||0||V = y⊕ h1.
- Computes h2 = H2(m||0||IDB) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P)h2 . if not, returns⊥. Else, returnsm.
Actually, the reduced encryption scheme is combination of the basic encryption scheme, denoted BFE, proposed by Boneh
and Franklin [1] and a one-time signature scheme.
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Table 1
Comparison between the dominant operations required for IDGSC and other schemes.
Schemes Sign/Encrypt Decrypt/Verify
mul. in G1 exps. in G2 eˆ cps. mul. in G1 exps. in G2 eˆ cps.
[13] 3 0 0(+1) 0 1 3(+1)
[12] 2 2 0(+2) 0 2 2(+2)
[3] 3 1 0(+1) 2 0 3(+1)
[7] 2 0 0(+2) 1 0 4
[5] 3 0 0(+1) 1 0 3
[11] 5 0 0(+1) 1 0 3(+1)
NIDGSC 3 1 0(+1) 0 2 2(+2)
4. Efficiency analysis and security results
4.1. Efficiency analysis
Themain purpose of generalized signcryption is to reduce implementation complexity. According to different application
environments, generalized signcryption can fulfill the function of signature, encryption or signcryption respectively.
However, the computation complexity may increase compared with the normal signcryption scheme. As with [9,16], these
schemes all need an additional secure MAC function which not only increase the computation complexity but also the
implementation complexity. Fortunately, these additional requirements are not needed in our scheme. Moreover, our
scheme is as efficient as [5], which is the most efficient identity based signcryption scheme. In Table 1 below we compare
the computation complexity of our scheme, denoted NIDGSC, with several famous signcryption schemes.We usemul., exps.
and cps. as abbreviations for multiplications, exponentiations and computations respectively. Here, the computations that
can be pre-calculated will be denoted by (+?).
4.2. Security results
In this section we will state the security results for our scheme under the security model defined in Section 2.2. Our
results are all in the random oracle model. In each of the results below we assume that the adversary makes qi queries to Hi
for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. qs and qu denote the number of Signcrypt and Unsigncrypt queries made by the adversary respectively. n3
and n4 denote the bit length of an element in group G1 and G2 respectively.
Theorem 1. If there is an EF-ACMA adversary A of NIDGSC in signature-mode that succeeds with advantage advef−acmaAidgsc−in−sg (t, p),
then there is a simulator C that can forge a valid signature of PSG with advantage ξ ≈ advef−acmaAidgsc−in−sg (t, p).
When NIDGSC works as a signature scheme, it is actually the signature scheme, PSG, proposed by Paterson [14]. The PSG
scheme itself is EF-ACMA secure. Considering Signcrypt/Unsigncrypt query that is absent in the normal signature scheme,
these queries are useless to the adversary of NIDGSC-IN-SG. Because the identities of sender and receiver are included in
the signature. There are two ways to modify these values. First, the adversary must find a special Hash collision. Second, the
adversary succeeds in solving the ECDLP [6] problem. In such cases, the adversary has negligible advantage to modify these
values. So an EF-ACMA adversary can attack the PSG scheme if he can attack NIDGSC in signature mode.
Theorem 2. Let Advind−cca2Aidgsc−in−en(t, p) = ξ be advantage of an IND-CCA2 adversary A of NIDGSC in encryption-mode, then ξ is
polynomial time negligible.
When NIDGSC works as an encryption scheme, it is actually the combination of the basic identity based encryption
schemeproposed by [1] and a one-time signature scheme. Owing to the theoremproposed by Canetti et al. [4], this combined
encryption scheme is secure against normal adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack. Considering Signcrypt/Unsigncrypt query,
the adversary cannot transform the target encryption ciphertext into a valid signcryption ciphertext. This conclusion is based
on the EF-ACMA security of PSG. So NIDGSC in encryption mode is IND-CCA2 secure.
Theorem 3. If A can forge valid signcryption ciphertext of NIDGSC in signcryption-mode successfully with advantage
Advef−acmaAidgsc−insc (t, p), then there is a simulator C that can forge valid signature of PSG with advantage ξ :
ξ > Advef−acmaAidgsc−insc (t, p)+ (q1 · qs)/2n4 + qu/(2n2 · 2n1 · 2n3).
The corresponding proofs are given in Appendix A.
Theorem 4. If there is an IND-IBSC-CCA2 adversary A of NIDGSC in signcryption-mode that succeeds with advantage
Advind−cca2Aidgsc−in−sc (t, p), then there is a challenger C running in polynomial time that solves the weak BCDH problem with advantage
ξ :
ξ > Advind−cca2Aidgsc−in−sc (t, p)/(q0·q1).
The definition of weak BCDH problem and corresponding proofs are given in Appendix B.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper, we define the security model for IDGSC and propose an efficient IDGSC which is proved secure under this
security model. Compared with existing generalized signcryption schemes, our scheme does not need an extra secure MAC
function. So it has less implementation complexity.What’s more, it is almost as efficient as the normal signcryption scheme.
An interesting open question is to design a non-ID based (public key or Certificateless) generalized signcryption scheme
that does not need an additional MAC function.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 3
We will reduce the attack to EF-ACMA of NIDGSC to EF-ACMA of PSG proposed by Paterson [14]. Hence, we define two
experiments Exp 1 and Exp 2. In each experiment, the private and public key and the Random Oracle’s coin flipping space
are not changed. The difference between Exp 1 and Exp 2 comes from rules of oracle service that challenger provides for the
adversary.
Exp 1
In this experiment, we use the standard technique to simulate Hash functions used in our scheme. It is well-known that
no adversary can distinguish between this environment and the real environment in polynomially bounded time. Let S0
denote the event that EF-ACMA adversary can attack NIDGSC successfully in Exp 1.
The challenger C needs to keep four lists Li, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 which are vacant at the very beginning. These lists are used to
record answers to the corresponding Hash Hi, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 query.
Setup.At the beginning, the challenger C runs the algorithm Setup(1k) and acts as PKG. That is, he generates the global public
system parameters (params, PPub) and the master private key s. Then, he sends (params, PPub) to the adversary A.
Probe.We now describe how the challenger simulates various queries.
Simulator: H0(IDU)
- If the record (IDU ,QU , SU) is found in L0, then returns QU .
- Else chooses QU randomly from G∗1; computes SU = sQU ; stores (IDU ,QU , SU) in L0 and returns QU .
Simulator: H1(w)
- Searches (w, h1) in the list L1. If such a pair is found, returns h1.
- Otherwise chooses h1 randomly from {0, 1}n2 × {0, 1}n1 × G∗1 , and puts (w, h1) into L1 and returns h1.
Simulator: H2(m||IDA||IDB)
- Searches (m||IDA||IDB, h2) in List L2. If such a pair is found, returns h2.
- Otherwise chooses h2 randomly from Z∗q , and puts (m||IDA||IDB, h2) into L2 and returns h2.
Simulator: H3(m||X)
- Searches (m||X, h3) in the list L3. If such a pair is found, returns h3.
- Otherwise chooses h3 randomly from Z∗q , and puts (m||X, h2) into L3 and returns h3.
Simulator: Extract(IDU)
We assume that Amakes the query H0(IDU) before it makes extract query for IDU .
- Searches L0 for the entry (IDU ,QU , SU) corresponding to IDU , and responds with SU .
Simulator: Sign(IDA,m), Verify(IDB, σ )
The challenger can easily answer these queries for the adversary. Because the challenger initializes the system and he
knows themaster key. So he can use signer IDA’s private key to signmessagem and use the receiver IDB’s public key to verify
the signature σ faithfully according to IDGSC-IN-SG. The only difference is substituting the above Hash simulators for Hash
functions.
Simulator: Encrypt(IDB,m), Decrypt(IDB, ε)
The challenger can get receiver IDB’s public key and private key. So he can supply these services for the adversary. Also
the Hash functions in the scheme use the above Hash simulators.
Simulator: GSC(IDA, IDB,m), GUC(IDA, IDB, δ)
The challenger can get sender IDA’s public key and private key and receiver IDB’s public key and private key. So he can
supply these services for the adversary. Here, the Hash functions also use the above Hash simulators.
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Exp 2
In this experiment, we will remove the layer of encryption and reduce the signcryption scheme to PSG scheme. In the
Setup phase, the challenger initializes the system just like he does in Exp 1. In the Probe phase, besides following simulators,
challenger acts same with Exp 1.
Simulator: Sign(IDA,m), Verify(IDB, σ )
Here, the challenger will follow PSG to accomplish these simulations.
Simulator: GSC(IDA, IDB,m)
Here, the challenger will keep another list Ls to record the GSC queries that the adversary asks.
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||IDA||IDB) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2P + h3 · SA).
- Selects h1 uniformly from {0, 1}n2 ×{0, 1}n1 ×G∗1 and adds (∗, h1) in List L1. The first element is vacant, and will be given
some value later.
- Computes y = m||IDA||V ⊕ h1 and adds (X, y, V , IDA, IDB,m) to List Ls.
- Outputs ciphertext (X, y). (Here, h2, h3 come from the corresponding Hash Simulators.)
Simulator: GUC(IDA, IDB, δ)
- Searches (∗||IDA||IDB, ∗) in the list L2, if such a record (m||IDA||IDB, h2) is found, goes to the next step. Else, returns⊥.
- Searches (m||∗, ∗) in the list L3, if such a record (m||X, h3) is found, goes to the next step. Else, returns⊥.
- Searches (X, ∗, ∗, IDA, IDB,m) in the list Ls, if such a record (X, y, V , IDA, IDB,m) is found, goes to the next step. Else,
returns⊥.
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P)h2 · eˆ(PPub,QA)h3 , if not, returns⊥.
- Else computesw = eˆ(X, SB) and h1 = y⊕m||IDA||V .
- Searches (∗, h1) in the list L1, if such a record is found, the first element defined to bew and returnsm. Else, returns⊥.
Nowwe discuss the difference between Exp 1 and Exp 2. The adversary can distinguish Exp 1 from Exp 2 if the following
events happened. Firstly, during the Signcrypt query, if the adversary has made the query H1(w), where w happened to be
the vacant value of some record. The probability of such event happening is at most q1/2n4 . The adversarymade qs Signcrypt
query. So the probability of such events happening is atmost (q1 · qs)/2n4 in total. Secondly, during the Unsigncrypt query, if
the adversary has guessed plaintext of some ciphertext. The probability of such event happening is atmost 1/(2n2 · 2n1 · 2n3).
The adversarymade qu Unsigncrypt query. So the probability of such events happening is at most qu/(2n2 · 2n1 · 2n3) in total.
Let S1 denote adversary can attack successfully in Exp 2. So, we have:
| Pr(S0)− Pr(S1)| ≤ (qh1 · qs)/2n4 + qu/(2n2 · 2n1 · 2n3).
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 4
Weak BCDH problem. (G1,+) and (G2, ·) are two cycle groups of prime order q, P is a generator of G1, eˆ : G1×G1 → G2
is a bilinear map between G1 and G2. Given (P, aP, bP, cP, 1c P), where a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , the strong BDH problem is to compute
eˆ(P, P)abc .
Proof. If there is an IND-CCA2 adversary A of IDGSC in the signcryption mode, then the challenger C can use it to solve the
strong BDH problem. Let (P, aP, bP, cP, 1c P) be an instance of the weak BCDH problem that C wants to solve. At first, C runs
the Setup(1k) algorithm to produce parameters params. It sets the public key as PPub = cP , although it does not know the
master key c . And then C sends (params, PPub) to the adversary A.
Besides the four lists Li, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, the challenger C also needs to keep another list Ls which is used to record answers
to the Signcrypt query.
Phase 1
Simulator: H0(IDU)
At the beginning, C chooses ib uniformly at random from 1, . . . q0. We assume that A does not make repeat queries.
- If i = ib responds with H0(IDU) = bP and sets IDU = IDb.
- Else chooses k uniformly at random from Z∗q ; computes QU = kP and SU = kPPub; stores (IDU ,QU , SU , k) in L0 and
responds with QU .
Simulator: H1(w)
- Searches (w, h1) in List L1. If such a pair is found, returns h1.
- Otherwise chooses h1 randomly from {0, 1}n2 × {0, 1}n2 × G∗1 , and puts (w, h1) into L1 and returns h1.
Simulator: H2(m||ID1||ID2)
- Searches (m||ID1||ID2, h2) in List L2. If such a pair is found, returns h2.
- Otherwise chooses h2 randomly from Z∗q , and puts (m||ID1||ID2, h2) into L2 and returns h2.
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Simulator: H3(m||X)
- Searches (m||X, h3) in the list L3. If such a pair is found, returns h3.
- Otherwise chooses h3 randomly from Z∗q , and puts (m||X, h3) into L3 and returns h3.
Simulator: Extract(IDU)
We assume that Amakes the query H0(IDU) before it makes extract query for IDU .
- If IDU = IDb, aborts the simulation.
- Else, searches L0 for the entry (IDU ,QU , SU , k) corresponding to IDU , and responds with SU .
Simulator: Sign(ID1,m)
We assume that Amakes the query H0(ID1) before Sign(ID1,m) query.
Case 1: ID1 6= IDb
- Find the entry (ID1,Q1, S1, k) in L0.
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||0) and h3 = H2(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2P + h3 · S1).
- Outputs (X,m||ID1||V ). (Here Hi, i = 2, 3, comes from the simulator above.)
Case 2: ID1 = IDb
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rPPub.
- Computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||0) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2 · 1c P + h3 · bP).
- Outputs (X,m||ID1||V ). (Here Hi, i = 2, 3, comes from the simulator above. )
Simulator: Verify(ID1, σ )
- Computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||0), If (m||ID1||0, h2) /∈ L2, returns⊥.
- Computes h3 = H3(m||X), If (m||X, h3) /∈ L3, returns⊥.
- If ID1 /∈ L0, returns⊥; else computes Q0 = H0(ID1).
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P)h2 · eˆ(PPub,Q1)h3 , if not, returns⊥. Else, returns>.
Simulator: Encrypt(ID2,m)
We assume that A has made the H0(ID2) query before Encrypt(ID2,m) query.
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
- Computes h2 = H2(m||0||ID2) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1h2P .
- Computes QB = H0(ID2) andw = eˆ(PPub,Q2)r .
- Computes h1 = H1(w) and y = m||0||V ⊕ h1.
- Outputs (X, y). (Here Hi, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, comes from the simulator above.)
Simulator: Decrypt(ID2, ε)
We assume that Amakes the query H0(ID2) before Decrypt(ID2, ε).
Case 1: ID2 6= IDb
- Find the entry (ID2,Q2, S2, k) in L0.
- Computesw = eˆ(X, S2) and h1 = H1(w).
- If (w, h1) /∈ L1, returns⊥. Else, computesm||0||V = y⊕ h1.
- Computes h2 = H2(m||0||ID2), If (m||0||ID2, h2) /∈ L2, returns⊥.
- Computes h3 = H3(m||X), If (m||X, h3) /∈ L3, returns⊥.
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P)h2 , if not, returns⊥. Else, returnsm.
Case 2: ID2 = IDb
Step through the list L1 with entries (w, h1) as follows:
- Computesm||0||V = y⊕ h1.
- Ifm||0||ID2 ∈ L2, computes h2 = H2(m||0||ID2); else moves to the next entry in L1 and begin again.
- Ifm||X ∈ L3, computes h3 = H3(m||X); else moves to the next entry in L1 and begin again.
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P)h2 . If so, returnsm; else moves to the next entry in L1 and begin again.
- If no message has been returned after stepping through L1, return⊥.
Simulator: Signcrypt(ID1, ID2,m)
We assume that Amakes the query H0(ID1) and H0(ID2) before making signcrypt query using identity ID1 and ID2.
Case 1: ID1 6= IDb
- Find the entry (ID1,Q1, S1, k) in L0.
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rP .
G. Yu et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 3614–3624 3623
- Computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||ID2) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2P + h3S1).
- Computes Q2 = H0(ID2) andw = eˆ(PPub,Q2)r .
- Computes h1 = H1(w) and y = m||ID1||V ⊕ h1.
- Outputs (X, y). (Here Hi, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, comes from the simulator above.)
Case 2: ID1 = IDb
- Find the entry (ID2,Q2, S2, k) in L0.
- Selects r uniformly from Z∗q , and computes X = rPPub.
- Computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||ID2) and h3 = H3(m||X).
- Computes V = r−1(h2 · 1c P + h3 · bP).
- Computesw = eˆ(X, S2), h1 = H1(w) and y = m||ID1||V ⊕ h1.
- Outputs (X, y). (Here Hi, i = 1, 2, 3, comes from the simulator above.)
Simulator: Unsigncrypt(ID1, ID2, ε)
We assume that Amakes the query H0(ID1) and H0(ID2) before making this query using these identities.
Case 1: ID2 6= IDb
- Find the entry (ID2,Q2, S2, k) in L0.
- Computesw = eˆ(X, S2) and h1 = H1(w).
- If (w, h1) /∈ L1, returns⊥. Else, computesm||ID1||V = y⊕ h1.
- Computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||ID2), If (m||ID1||ID2, h2) /∈ L2, returns⊥.
- Computes h3 = H3(m||X), If (m||X, h3) /∈ L3, returns⊥.
- If ID1 = ID2 or ID1 /∈ L0, returns⊥; else computes Q1 = H0(ID1).
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P)h2 · eˆ(PPub,Q1)h3 , if not, returns⊥. Else, returnsm.
Case 2: ID2 = IDb
Step through the list L1 with entries (w, h1) as follows:
- Computesm||ID1||V = y⊕ h1.
- If ID1 = ID2 or ID1 /∈ L0, moves to the next entry in L1 and begin again; else computes Q1 = H0(ID1).
- Ifm||ID1||ID2 ∈ L2, computes h2 = H2(m||ID1||ID2); else moves to the next entry in L1 and begin again.
- Ifm||X ∈ L3, computes h3 = H3(m||X); else moves to the next entry in L1 and begin again.
- Checks that eˆ(X, V ) = eˆ(P, P)h2 · eˆ(PPub,Q1)h3 . If so, returnsm; else moves to the next entry in L1 and begin again.
- If no message has been returned after stepping through L1, return⊥.
Challenge. At the end of Phase 1, the adversary A outputs two identities, IDA and IDB, two messages, m1 and m2. If
IDB 6= IDb, aborts the simulation; else it sets X∗ = aP and then chooses γ ∈ {0, 1}, and y∗ ∈ {0, 1}n2 × {0, 1}n2 × G∗1
at random. At last, it returns the challenge ciphertext δ∗ = (X∗, y∗) to A.
Phase 2.
The queries made in Phase 2 are responded in the same way as those made in Phase 1. Here, the queries follow the
restrictions that are defined in Game 6.
Guess.
At the end of Phase 2, A outputs a bit γ
′
. If γ
′ = γ , the challenger C outputs the answer to the weak BCDH problem:
w∗ = eˆ(X∗, SB) = eˆ(P, P)abc .
Let’s analyze the probability that the simulation can succeed. Two simulators need to be noted. First, in the challenge
stage, the simulator hopes that the adversary chosen IDb as the target recipient identity. Thiswill be the casewith probability
at least 1/q0. If this is not the case, therewill be an errorwhen the adversary tries tomakequery Extract(IDb). Second, in Phase
2, if the adversary makes query H1(w = eˆ(P, P)abc), the simulation will fail. However, with probability 1/q1 the challenger
can guess the answer of the weak BCDH problem from the records in List L1. From the above remarks we conclude that the
challenger can solve the weak BCDH problem with probability at least: Advind−cca2Aidgsc−in−sc (t, p)/(q0·q1).
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